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Abstract:  
This paper studies the contracting choices between an entrepreneur and venture capital 
investors in a portfolio context. We rely on the mean-variance framework and derive the 
optimal choices for an entrepreneur with and without the presence of different kinds of 
venture capitalists. In particular, we show that the entrepreneur always has the incentive 
to share the risk and benefits of the venture whenever possible. On the basis of their 
objectives and characteristics, we distinguish the situations of the corporate, 
independent, and bank-sponsored venture capital funds. Our framework enables us to 
derive the optimal contract design for the entrepreneur, featuring the choice of investor, 
the entrepreneur’s investment in the venture, and her dilution in  the project’s equity as a 
function of her bargaining power. This result allows us to characterize the choice of the 
investor depending on her cost of equity and debt capital. In addition to project size and 
risk, entrepreneur’s risk aversion turns out to be a critical determinant of VC investor 
choice –a finding which is strongly supported by a panel analysis of VC fund flows for 5 
European countries over the 2002-2009 period. 
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1 Introduction
To date, financial research devoted to the determination of the entrepreneur’s cost of capital in the
context of portfolio choice has preferably applied principles based on the integration of illiquid assets in
the CAPM framework (see in particular Meulbroeck, 2001; Kerins et al., 2004). The specificity of the
entrepreneurial project, and the impossibility to partition it into transferable financial securities make
it diﬃcult to precisely assess the relevant risk premium. Still, within the context of the CAPM, it is
possible to move forward to address a mean-variance formulation of the cost of capital. Garvey (2001)
introduces an entrepreneur-specific project into the classical framework, and relates the venture’s
cost of capital to the entrepreneur’s risk aversion coeﬃcient. But he further goes in the direction
of identifying the cost of capital in a pure portfolio context with only financial assets. So far, the
examination of the entrepreneur’s problem within the portfolio theory framework has not dealt with
the explicit intervention of an outside investor such as a venture capitalist, in spite of the relevance of
this scenario.
At another level, the vast majority of the researchers addressing the initial investment relationship
between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists focus on information asymmetries, liquidity, costs, and
the value-added of the venture.1 Upstream from this approach, several issues are still unresolved and
can be directly considered within the CAPM equilibrium framework. Amongst the most important
ones, the entrepreneur’s choice to resort to a venture capitalist raises two questions that directly relate
to a portfolio problem: (i) would the availability of a venture capital contract induce the entrepreneur
to undertake a profitable venture if she did not otherwise? and (ii) could the characteristics of such
a contract enhance the risk-return properties of the entrepreneur’s global portfolio? To the best of
our knowledge, despite their importance, these questions have not been addressed in the financial
literature.
In a dispassionate context where economic agents are rational risk averters with homogeneous
1See Schwienbacher (2007) for a review.
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information, our paper studies the determinants of contracting preferences between the entrepreneur
and the investor in a pure portfolio choice context, where allocation decisions are taken on the basis
of risk and return characteristics. These preferences feature the choice of the investor type and the
characteristics of the contract between the entrepreneur and the selected investor. We deliberately
leave aside considerations regarding the positive externalities brought by the investor on the intrinsic
value of the venture (i.e. reduction of risk and/or enhancement of expected returns), and concentrate
on the pure portfolio issues. Because her financial surface is much larger than the entrepreneur’s, the
venture capitalist fully perceives the diversification potential of the project in her global portfolio.
Hence, the same undertaking induces a lower risk penalty for the professional investor than for the
entrepreneur, resulting in an inducement for the entrepreneur to transfer part of project risk and
forego a proportionally larger share of project excess return. As a major outcome of this analysis, we
get that the entrepreneur always has a rational incentive to seek for an outside investor in the venture,
even if she would have undertaken the project anyway and despite the fact that the investor would
not bring any added value to the project. Bringing an analogy to insurance policies, the reason for this
positive result has to be found by the risk sharing property of the contract, whereby the entrepreneur
is better oﬀ by giving up some project return in excess of financial asset in exchange of a more-than
proportional reduction in her global risk exposure through the venture capital contract.
The second aspect of the venture capital financing decision is related to the choice of which investor
type to contract with. The literature devoted to the determinants of this decision is abundant. Be-
sides their usual categorization based on their level of involvement in the venture, potential investors
can be discriminated in various ways, such as level of private information (Ueda, 2004; Chemmanur
and Chen, 2006), availability of internal resources (Katila et al., 2008; Subramaniam, 2009), expe-
rience (Sørensen, 2007), presence of complementarities (Hellmann et al., 2008), perceived experience
by entrepreneurs (Bengtsson and Wang, 2010) or project innovativeness (Hirsch and Walz, 2006).
Consistent with the context of portfolio theory, we adopt a partitioning of investors with a semantic
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similar to Hirsch and Walz (2006) and Hellmann et al. (2008), based on the distinction between
independent, corporate or bank-sponsored venture capital investors. Such a classification enables us
to analyze investor characteristics from the point of view of their cost of capital, which would be their
major source of diﬀerence in a risk-return framework. We derive that the optimal choice of investor
depends on her cost of capital components, on the risk aversion level of the entrepreneur and on the
characteristics of the project, but is independent of the design of the contract itself. In particular,
investor selection is not contingent on the bargaining power of the entrepreneur.
Starting from the same neutral point of view, in the absence of synergy or asymmetric information
eﬀects, we endogenize important contractual elements such as the proportion of capital invested and
the entrepreneur’s equity ownership from the point of view of the relative strength of the contracting
agents. Regarding the entrepreneur, our major finding is the separation between the decision of how
much to invest in the venture, which only depends on cost, risk level and risk tolerance characteristics,
and the arrangement of the share of equity held in the project, after dilution, which depends on
the bargaining power of the contractors. Our findings that, whatever the contractual arrangements,
the entrepreneur’s stake in the project decreases with project risk and increases with her wealth
endowment, holds firmly in our framework with symmetric information. We do not have to resort to
signaling (Leland and Pyle, 1977) or agency theory (Bitler et al., 2005) to make such a derivation.
The portfolio approach to venture capital has the potential to fill an important gap in the economic
motivations of venture investments. We show that, whenever possible, the entrepreneur has always
a rational incentive to enter a contract with a venture capitalist. By partitioning venture capital
investor groups into corporate, independent, and bank-sponsored funds, we identify the discriminating
factors that drive the choices of contractors and contracts in a pure context, i.e. in the absence of
externalities induced by the relationship, but where the diﬀerence between investors is driven by
market imperfections regarding their cost of capital. Our framework enables us to derive the optimal
contract design for the entrepreneur, featuring the choice of investor, the entrepreneur’s share in
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the venture, and her dilution in the project’s equity as a function of her bargaining power. This
result allows us to link the optimal investor choice to her cost of equity and debt. Combined with
our numerical analysis, the results derived in this study shed new light on the fundamental choices
underlying the entrepreneur-investor relationships.
A panel data analysis of venture capital fund flows in five European countries over the 2002-2009
period provides strong support for one of the main predictions of our model, namely the relation
between entrepreneur’s risk aversion and the choice of venture capital investor type. In line with our
predictions, we find a clear tendency to finance with independent funding sources in a low risk aversion
environment, while bank-sponsored funds are financed when risk aversion is higher. Furthermore, we
theoretically as well as empirically show a substitution eﬀect between bank-sponsored versus corporate
funds. We also emphasize the importance of the level of risk aversion on the financing choice for
diﬀerent stages of corporate development.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. In sections 3 and 4, we
characterize the preferences and contracts between the entrepreneur and the venture capital investors.
The fifth section presents the results of the numerical analysis. In section 6, we report our empirical
analysis. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Setup
Consider a financial market where a set of risky securities and a risk-free asset are traded in the
absence of arbitrage. There are two agents: a potential entrepreneur (e) and a financial investor.
Both have full access to all traded securities, but may diﬀer in their risk aversion. The entrepreneur,
whose endowment is normalized to 1, has proprietary access to a non-marketed venture investment
π yielding a rate of return rπ. This venture is not accessible to the investor. We assume that the
venture initial outlay is K > 1 so that the entrepreneur needs additional financing to undertake it.2
2The initial outlay K should be viewed as the amount in the project that cannot be diversified
away by combining it with risky assets or by resorting to alternative funding sources, such as family
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All portfolio rates of return r˜j are entirely characterized by their expectation rj ≡ E(r˜j), their
standard deviation σj ≡ σ(r˜j) and their beta βjm with respect to the market portfolio m. The
return on the riskless asset is denoted rf . For any given portfolio j, each agent a assigns a utility
score E(Ua(j)) ≡ Uaj = rj − 12γaσ2j , where Uaj is a shortcut for the expected utility operator and γa
represents the agent’s constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient.3
The CAPM with two-fund separation holds on the financial market. At equilibrium with financial
assets, each investor holds her utility-maximizing portfolio φ by combining the risk-free asset with the
market portfolio with expected return rm.
2.1 Absence of venture capitalist
When scaled by its relative size, the project’s risk-return trade-oﬀ (Kσπ, rf +K (rπ − rf )) locates it
above the market market CML for the entrepreneur.4 In the absence of any financial investor, the
entrepreneur has to choose between her initial financial portfolio and the investment in the venture
financed through a loan.
The no-venture case If the entrepreneur does not undertake the venture, she holds a portfolio
of financial assets whose expected rate of return is:
reφ =
σeφ
σm
rm +
µ
1−
σeφ
σm
¶
rf ,
where
σeφ = argmax
σ
µ
σ
σm
rm +
µ
1− σ
σm
¶
rf −
1
2
γeσ2
¶
=
rm − rf
γeσm
.
The entrepreneur’s initial utility score is
Ueφ = rf +
1
2γe
µ
rm − rf
σm
¶2
= rf +
1
2γe
Ã
reφ − rf
σeφ
!2
. (1)
and friends.
3Throughout, subscripts and superscripts refer to portfolios and agents, respectively.
4Because the project risk is not wholly diversifiable for the investor, the Security Market Line is
not adequate for the analysis of the project risk and return. See Garvey (2001) for a discussion.
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The self-financed venture case To self-finance the project, the entrepreneur must borrow
K − 1 at the risk-free rate.5 The expected return from her investment in the venture has expectation
rf+K (rπ − rf ) and standard deviation Kσπ. The expected utility extracted from the venture project
is
Ueπ = rf +K (rπ − rf )−
1
2
γeK2σ2π. (2)
The characterization of the venture is relevant when the following two conditions are met: (C1) the
investment opportunity induces a higher risk for the entrepreneur than her financial portfolio φ, i.e.
Kσπ > σφ; (C2) the venture investment lies above the CML, i.e.
rπ−rf
σπ
> rm−rfσm .
Proposition 1 Under conditions (C1) and (C2), the venture is self-financed iﬀ
γe < γe =
(rπ − rf ) +
r
(rπ − rf )2 − σ2π
³
rm−rf
σm
´2
Kσ2π
.
Given project and market risk-return profiles, the upper bound of entrepreneur’s risk aversion
for self-financing the venture is inversely related to K, which is the project size normalized by the
entrepreneur’s wealth. That is, all else equal, when the entrepreneur is highly financially constrained
(i.e. large K), it will take a low level of risk aversion for her to accept self-financing. In other words,
outside financing from venture capital is more likely to be needed when (i) entrepreneur’s risk aversion
is high, or (ii) entrepreneur’s financial constraint is high. The result of Proposition 1 represents the
starting point adopted by Garvey (2001) in his study of the cost of capital for the undiversified investor.
Our paper diverges by considering the interaction between the entrepreneur and the investor, while
Garvey’s analysis focuses on the entrepreneur’s portfolio choices and their impact on the required rate
of return for the venture.
5Considering a higher borrowing rate would not change the qualitative insights of the model.
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2.2 Availability of venture capital
The entrepreneur and the investor can enter a venture capital contract. Broadly speaking, such a
contract is characterized with two features. First, it specifies the participations of each party. We
denote 0 ≤ S ≤ K the amount invested by the entrepreneur, the remainder (K − S) comes from
the investor. Second, the contract determines how the expected returns generated by the venture
are split between the entrepreneur and the investor. Consistent with our contract characterization,
Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) report, in their empirical studies of 1,800 venture capital contracts,
six types of contract terms that fundamentally serve two goals: (i) to define the contingent cash
flows to be received by the investor (e.g. cumulative dividends or participation clauses) and (ii) to
define the contingent cash flows that the investor commits to put on the table (e.g pay-to-play clause).
Interestingly, the sharing rule of profits can diﬀer from the initial participations and dilution in venture
capital contracts reflect this diﬀerence. We therefore denote d SK the fraction of the expected project
revenues that the entrepreneur is entitled to, where d is the dilution factor.
Alternatively, dilution in the venture capital contract can be captured through an interest payment.
Taking dilution into account, the entrepreneur obtains an expected dSrπ from his investment on the
venture and (1−S)rf from his remaining endowment. Consider instead a contract where the investor
oﬀers the entrepreneur Srπ+(1− S) τ as a reward for the total investment, where τ denotes a riskless
contractual transfer rate. The two contracts are made equivalent by setting
τ =
S
1− S (d− 1) rπ + rf . (3)
If, for example S > 1, then the entrepreneur borrows extra money to increase her investment in
the venture. The investor oﬀers to lend this amount but proposes to charge a transfer rate τ > rf ,
hence from equation (3) d < 1. That is, the entrepreneur agrees to receive a diluted fraction of the
project revenues.6
6 In actual venture capital contracts, the entrepreneur often issues equity as well as convertible debt
and, later, mezzanine financing. It is therefore possible to mix an equity dilution factor d with a
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With d > 1 (i.e. dilution is favorable to the entrepreneur), the entrepreneur enjoys favorable terms
for lending (τ > rf if S < 1) or for borrowing (τ < rf if S > 1). This situation reflects the reward for
the entrepreneur’s "sweat equity" in the project. With d < 1, the reverse is true. Therefore, there is
no economic diﬀerence between defining a dilution factor d or setting a transfer rate τ .We will further
characterize the venture capital contract with the pair (S, τ).
A contract between the entrepreneur and the investor is feasible if each of them has an incentive to
participate. Denote Ua(S, τ) the expected utility extracted by agent a from the contract. A contract
is feasible iﬀ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Ue(S, τ) ≥ Ueφ,π ≡ max
³
Ueφ, U
e
π
´
Entrepreneur’s participation constraint
U i(S, τ) ≥ U iφ Investor’s participation constraint
(4)
A participation constraint becomes binding when the other agent has all the bargaining power
in the contract negotiation. If the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is binding, the contract is
investor-dominant. If the investor’s participation constraint is binding, the contract is entrepreneur-
dominant.
Whichever the investor’s type, the entrepreneur’s expected utility can be written as
Ue(S, τ) = τ + S (rπ − τ)−
1
2
γeS2σ2π. (5)
The investors’ commonly shared utility function is discussed below. The investors diﬀer from each
other by the parameter value.
2.3 Investor types
Building on earlier literature that has recognized some heterogeneity among venture capitalists, we
identify three archetypes of investors. First, Hellmann (2002), de Bettignies and Chemla (2003),
Chemmanur and Chen (2006), or Goldfarb et al. (2009) make a distinction between independent
debt-related rate τ in a single relationship. The model’s intuition is not altered by these contractual
arrangements.
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investors (e.g. business angels) and captive venture capitalists. This distinction is not only organiza-
tional or agency-based, but is also related to the goals for the investors who finance the fund. As our
setup does not introduce asymmetric information issues, only the second dimension is relevant in our
setup. Independent investors’ sole objective is to maximize profit through active management of their
portfolio of ventures. They have a significant commitment to the VC activity,7 and consequently the
complement portfolio to each individual venture investment is itself dominated by a number — that
can be large — of other ventures. This induces that the risk-return trade-oﬀ of the independent’s pool
of assets cannot be proxied by a financial portfolio such as a market index.
Besides their holding in the venture, shareholders of captive VCs hold a well-diversified portfolio of
financial assets. They also have access to financial markets for their leverage decision. Their involve-
ment in the venture capital industry is primarily motivated by the search for additional diversification
benefits through investment vehicles showing an attractive return potential at the expense of large
specific risks. Because each venture capital investment represents a tiny proportion of a large, balanced
portfolio, the specific risks are considered to be diversified away. This interpretation is in line with
the common explanation of the large capital inflows from U.S. pension funds in venture capital funds
following the 1979 amendment to Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s (ERISA’s) prudent
man rule (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Manigart et al. (2002) test and confirm the hypothesis that,
on average, captive VC funds require a rate of return from their investments that is lower than the one
required by independent venture capitalists. This finding lends support to the diversification argument
as a motive for setting up captive VC vehicles.
Another important distinction is made among captive venture capitalists (see e.g. Ueda, 2004,
Hirsch and Walz, 2006, Bottazzi et al., 2008, Hellmann et al., 2008, Bengtsson and Wang, 2010):
corporate VCs are owned by a parent company whereas bank-dependent VCs are subsidiaries of a
banking institution.8
7Bottazzi et al. (2008) document that independent VCs generally display more investor activism
than captive VCs.
8A venture capital fund can also be public, i.e. sponsored by the government. This case is specific
10
The bank-dependent VC, besides its activity as a venture capitalist, is a financial intermediary and
so has a significant deposit and lending activity, which leaves her with better funding and investment
conditions than the rest of the market. In our setup, this funding advantage is the major diﬀerence
with the angel investor and the corporate VC. Such a view is consistent with empirical evidence shown
by Hellmann et al. (2008) that a strategic motive for banks to invest in venture capital is to create
opportunities for enhanced lending possibilities, which is close to their actual core business as financial
intermediaries. Such a view also entails that the key dimension for classifying an investor as bank-
sponsored is the transformation of maturities at large. Therefore, unlike traditional classifications,
we associate the sponsoring activities of insurance companies (for their life insurance activities) and
pension funds to the ones of financial intermediaries.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each fund provider.
Insert Table 1 here
To get a better picture of the market, the market shares in total venture capital funds in Europe
and in the U.S. according to diﬀerent investor types are reported in Table 2. As underlined by Mayer et
al. (2005), the broad evidence reported in table 2 masks large cross-sectional geographical diﬀerences.
They report larger proportions of bank VC in Germany, of corporate VC in Israel, of pension funds
(assimilated to bank VC in our analysis as they act as a maturity transformation vehicle) in the
United Kingdom, and of government VC in the U.K. as well. Evidence from the U.S. shows a greater
commitment from endowments and foundations (more than 20% of the VC funding) and the virtual
absence of government-sponsored venture capital (NVCA, 2004).
Insert Table 2 here
We use superscripts ind, crp and bnk for the Independent, Corporate or Bank-sponsored types of
investors, respectively, for further analysis.
in that the public investor motives go beyond profit maximization. Its analysis requires further
assumptions related to social welfare criteria, and is left for future research.
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3 Characterization of preferences
Unlike the entrepreneur for whom the project scale represents a substantial fraction of her endowment,
the professional investor considers the project as a building block in her financial portfolio. For any
profit-maximizing investor with a well-diversified portfolio, the purpose of the investment is to provide
the fund’s shareholders the highest possible surplus over invested capital. The rationale underlying this
reasoning is the fact that, from Tobin’s separation theorem, financial investors dissociate their risky
investment decision from their financial leverage. Only the latter decision depends on their level of risk
tolerance. The only aim of the risky vehicles they invest in is to provide the highest possible residual
income, i.e. the surplus over the opportunity costs of their funds. Consequently, the profit-making VC
fund’s utility function can be written as the expected cash flow less the dollar-cost of capital of the
venture, i.e.
U i(S, τ) = CF i = (K − S) (rπ − µi)− (1− S)
¡
τ − κi
¢
, i = ind, crp, bnk, (6)
where µi and κi represent the opportunity cost of equity and the opportunity cost of risk-free financ-
ing/investment, respectively, which can diﬀer from one investor to another. The first term is the VC’s
net expected profit from the venture, while the second term accounts for the transfer to the entre-
preneur. As this utility function is expressed in terms of net cash flow, the corresponding reservation
utility U iφ is set to zero for all i.
Next, we turn to the identification of the opportunity costs applicable to each investor.
• The independent venture capital fund, with superscript ind, is held by a number of committed
private investors. They view the fund as an actively-managed overlay to their current portfolio,
whose aim is to provide a superior Sharpe ratio to a portfolio of traded assets. Hence they assess
the project in light of its contribution to the whole risk and return profile of the fund. The cost
of equity capital is thus µind = rf + βπind(rind − rf ), where rind and βπind stand for the fund’s
expected return and the project beta with respect to the fund, respectively.
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• The corporate venture capital fund, with superscript crp, represents a large pool of shareholders
who are well-diversified. Therefore, in line with Kerins et al. (2004), any investment opportunity
is assessed according to its position relative to the security market line. The corporate venture
capitalist has otherwise the possibility to borrow or lend on financial markets at the riskless rate.
• The bank-sponsored venture capital fund, with superscript bnk, is a subsidiary of a regulated
financial institution. The bank-sponsored venture capitalist starts with no initial endowment
but gets funding from its parent institution. It can count on the contractual amount 1 − S
transferred from the entrepreneur via a deposit account at the parent bank (if S < 1) or via a
loan contracted at the bank (if S > 1). Being a financial intermediary, the bank can finance
loans and invest deposits at better conditions than the market risk-free rate rf .9 We denote
rbf =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
rbl > rf if S > 1 (loan)
rbd < rf if S < 1 (deposit)
(7)
In line with their status, we assume that both the parent and the subsidiary are subject to
regulatory capital constraints. Namely, to participate in the venture, the fund has to withdraw
the full investment from the parent’s equity. As the parent institution is itself fully diversified,
we get the cost of equity capital according to the CAPM as for the corporate venture fund.10
Table 3 summarizes the inputs for the various investors’ utility maximization programs.
Insert Table 3 here
We now characterize and contrast the sets of contracts between the entrepreneur and the diﬀerent
categories of investors.
9This rate applies regardless of whether the bank-sponsored VC oﬀers the investor to lend or borrow
by the parent’s oﬃce or whether it negotiates a dilution factor d that will be financed through deposits
or invested in loans anyway.
10Alternatively, we could refer to Pillar I of the Basle III Accord to obtain that the regulatory capital
that the bank has to set aside equals 100% of the equity investment in the fund.
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4 Characterization of contracts
4.1 Feasible contracts
There exists a continuum of possible contracts (S, τ) between the entrepreneur and each type of
investor, depending on their relative bargaining powers. We will examine the extreme conditions,
when either the investor or the entrepreneur can impose the terms of the contract, to assess the scope
of feasible contracts.
The entrepreneur-dominant contract with investor i, is denoted (S[e,i], τ [e,i]). It corresponds to
the pair (S, τ) that maximizes the entrepreneur’s utility while satisfying the investor’s participation
constraint. Oppositely, the corresponding investor-dominant contract (S[i,e], τ [i,e]) maximizes the in-
vestor’s utility while binding the entrepreneur’s participation constraint.
The following proposition11 summarizes the characteristics of the non-degenerate contracts (S 6= 1):
Proposition 2 If µi − κi 6= γeσ2π, a non-degenerate contract (S∗i, τ∗i) between the entrepreneur and
the investor i is feasible when the following condition is respected:
τ [e,i] > τ∗i > τ [i,e] if S∗i < 1 and τ [e,i] < τ∗i < τ [i,e] if S∗i > 1,
where
τ [e,i] ≡ κi + K − S
∗i
1− S∗i (rπ − µ
i),
τ [i,e] ≡
Ueφ,π − S∗irπ + 12γe
¡
S∗i
¢2 σ2π
1− S∗i ,
and where the entrepreneur’s optimal level of investment S∗i is the same for any contract and is given
by
S∗i = S[e,i] = S[i,e] = min
µ
µi − κi
γeσ2π
,K
¶
,
with, for the bank-sponsored VC, the additional condition that:
γeσ2π + rbl < rf + βπm(rm − rf ) or γeσ2π + rbd > rf + βπm(rm − rf ).
11All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
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Proposition 2 yields a Corollary with a strong economic relevance.
Corollary 3 If the entrepreneur self-finances the venture, then any venture capital contract is feasible
in that it leaves both parties better-oﬀ.
Before contracting, the entrepreneur has proprietary access to a project with risk-return profile
(σπ, rπ). In one extreme case where the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power (entrepreneur-
dominant case), she and the venture capitalist will agree on the rate of transfer τ [e,i], which allows her
to shift her utility score from Ueφ to U
e
max. In the other extreme case where the venture capitalist has
all the bargaining power (investor-dominant case), they will agree on the rate of transfer τ [i,e], which
leaves the entrepreneur to the same initial utility score Ueφ (since the investor captures all the benefits
of the contract). In all cases, both parties agree on the same entrepreneur’s level of investment S∗.
The optimal share of the entrepreneur is constant regardless of the contract. This share only diﬀers
with the identity of the investor. Two extreme cases require some discussion: the corner solution S = K
and the no-transfer solution S = 1.
In the first situation, the entrepreneur takes over the whole project, and borrows money from the
investor. Note that Ue(K, rf ) = Ueφ. As stated in Table 2, there is no investor who oﬀers a lending
rate lower than rf , so there simply is no contract. Indeed, if the investor’s risk premium µi−κi is too
high relative to the preference-adjusted risk of the project γeσ2π, then there is no feasible contract. In
this case, the venture yields an attractive risk profile for the entrepreneur (low denominator of S∗i),
while it is costly to finance for the investor (high numerator), who then steps away.
The second situation is more insightful. The special case µi − κi = γeσ2π is the one where the
marginal cost of the project is equal to its marginal benefit for the entrepreneur, and so she merely
gives up the share of the project that she cannot finance herself. There is no transfer and thus no
dilution in that particular case.
For the bank-sponsored VC, the additional condition implies that situations where the lending
rate is very high or when the deposit rate is very low precludes the bank’s financial intermediation.
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In those situations, any transfer would become unacceptable for the entrepreneur who would receive
too little money for her deposits or would pay too much interest for her borrowing. In these cases,
the only feasible contract would be the degenerate one (1, 0) which is feasible if rπ − 12γeσ2π ≥ Ueφ,π.
Thus, this contract is much more than a curiosity, as it is likely to prevail in a wide variety of market
situations.
Corollary 3 shows that the entrepreneur would prefer to contract rather than undertaking the
project on her own. The rationale underlying this result is straightforward. The linear shape of the
utility function of the investor enables the entrepreneur to get rid of a share of the project’s risk in
exchange of a proportional premium. On the other hand, the concavity of the entrepreneur’s utility
function provide a gain in expected utility from risk sharing which is more than proportional to the
loss in returns. This implies that the presence of venture capitalists always induces the entrepreneur
to seek for a risk sharing contract to get venture capital financing. Indeed, as any feasible contract
satisfies the investor’s participation constraint, then both the entrepreneur and the investor are better
oﬀ with the contract than with their initial investment choice.
Insert Figure 1 here
Figures 1a and 1b provide a graphical representations of the feasible contracts between the entre-
preneur and the venture capitalist. In Figure 1a, the utility score of the project is not suﬃcient to
induce the entrepreneur to shift her money away from the initial financial portfolio. The availability
of a VC contract is powerful enough to shift up the expected utility, leading to a portfolio whose
risk is S∗iσπ and that intersects the straight line relating
¡
0, τ [i,e]
¢
to (Kσπ, rf +K(rπ − rf )) . In the
investor-dominant case, the entrepreneur has access to a lending rate which is just high enough to
make her indiﬀerent with the initial financial portfolio. If the bargaining power of the entrepreneur
increases, she can manage to raise her utility further, up to the moment when the investor’s partici-
pation constraint becomes binding. This situation corresponds to the upper segment originating from
point (Kσπ, rf +K(rπ − rf )) in the figure.
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The idea put forward in Corollary 3 is best illustrated in Figure 1b. The project is attractive as it
clearly stands above the Capital Market Line. If the entrepreneur could self-finance the project, she
would increase her utility level, but in the absence of venture capital, she is financially constrained
and can only obtain the utility score Ueφ derived from investing on financial markets. Nevertheless,
the availability of a VC contract enhances the level of expected utility, up to the maximum achievable
indiﬀerence curve Uemax corresponding to the entrepreneur-dominant contract, as shown by the arrow
represented on the figure.
This finding sheds new light on the discussion provided by Schwienbacher (2007) about the en-
trepreneur’s choice between the "just-do-it" versus the "wait-and-see" strategy. In our model, where
access to the venture capital market is assumed to be readily available to the entrepreneur and the
project is found to be good, the "just-do-it" (adventurous) strategy of immediately investing in the
project and attracting the complement through venture capital, is indeed always the best choice. It
holds irrespective of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion, which can be related to the entrepreneurship
style. Individuals pursuing the "wait-and-see" strategy can only do it rationally if they do not fit into
our framework. This means that their decision to wait before investing in the venture would not be
driven by some reluctance to share the venture’s profits with an external investor, but rather by the
fact that the project is not ready for investment and they could not attract a venture capitalist.
We turn to the discussion of feasible contracts and the comparison of contracts with diﬀerent
types of investors. This analysis of existence of feasible contracts and the comparison of contracts
with diﬀerent types of investors is instructive about the properties of the venture capital markets in
a portfolio theory approach.
4.2 Contracting preferences
We first characterize the solution of the bargaining game between the entrepreneur and the investor.
Next, we study the determinants of contracting preferences with the three types of investors.
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4.2.1 Optimal contract design
The project is specific to the entrepreneur, but there are three possible kinds of investors she can
contract with. Thus, two facets characterize the optimal contract design: the choice of the contractor
and the terms of the contract.
If all the bargaining power lies within the hands of the entrepreneur, she will choose to contract with
the investor that enables her to maximize expected utility while binding the investor’s participation
constraint. Therefore, the program to maximize is
U [e,¯ı] = max
i=ind,crp,bnk
h
Ue(S∗i, τ [e,i])− Ueφ,π
i
s.t. U i(S∗i, τ [e,i]) = 0. (8)
In the mirror case, the investor maximizes net cash flows while imposing a level of utility to the
entrepreneur. If each investor competing for the same project is able to dictate the contract to the
entrepreneur, the winner will be the one for whom the surplus extracted from the contract is highest.
The resulting level of utility for the investor achieving the largest net return is given by:
U [¯ı,e] = max
i=ind,crp,bnk
U i(S∗i, τ [i,e]) s.t. Ue(S∗i, τ [i,e]) = Ueφ,π. (9)
Between these two extreme cases, the entrepreneur and each type of investor enter a bargaining
game.12 We adopt the solution proposed by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to solve for the surplus split
between the entrepreneur and the investor. Specifically, denoting η as the entrepreneur’s bargaining
power, and 1−η as the investor’s bargaining power, the Nash solution to the bargaining game between
the entrepreneur and investor i is the sharing rule that maximizes the following surplus
G(S∗i, τ∗i; η) =
£
Ue(S∗i, τ∗i)− Ueφ,π
¤η £
U i(S∗i, τ∗i)
¤1−η
. (10)
Note that the optimal contract design involves two objectives: (i) for a given investor, finding the
optimal contract terms
¡
S∗i(η), τ∗i(η)
¢
as a function of the bargaining power η; and (ii) determining
12To simplify the optimal contract derivation, we abstract from competition eﬀects that would result
from interactions between multiple investors dealing with multiple entrepreneurs.
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the kind of investor for whom the game output is maximized. So the objective function is
max
i=ind,crp,bnk
max
S∗i,τ∗i
G(S∗i, τ∗i; η). (11)
Given the optimal share of the venture determined in Proposition 2 and the range of transfer rates
that corresponds to each type of investor, we can characterize the optimal contract terms and the
optimal investor choice altogether, provided that there exists an interior solution for S∗i, through the
following Proposition.
Proposition 4 If the entrepreneur can enter a non-degenerate venture capital contract with any type
of investor, the solution of the Nash bargaining game in equation (10) with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is given by
S∗ı¯(η) = S∗ı¯ =
µı¯ − κı¯
γeσ2π
,
τ∗ı¯(η) = ητ [e,¯ı] + (1− η)τ [¯ı,e],
ı¯ = argmax
i=ind,crp,bnk
Ã
κi −Kµi +
¡
µi − κi
¢2
2γeσ2π
!
with
µi − κi
γeσ2π
< K.
In particular, G(S∗ı¯, τ∗ı¯; 1) = U [e,¯ı] and G(S∗ı¯, τ∗ı¯; 0) = U [¯ı,e].
The determinants of the optimal investor choice involves a mix of investor, project and entrepreneur-
related elements. The function to maximize provides the impact of the characteristics that diﬀerentiate
investors, namely µi and κi, in case of an interior solution. It is straightforward to see that, ceteris
paribus, their impact are both indeterminate on the entrepreneur’s preferences, depending on the
values taken by the triplet (K, γe, σ2π). This result calls for a closer look at the possible contracts,
as discussed hereafter. The situation where µ
i−κi
γeσ2π
≥ K corresponds to the corner solution in which
S∗i = K, where we have seen that the entrepreneur would indeed be at least as well oﬀ with her
financial portfolio φ.
Conditionally on the optimal investor choice, the optimal contract characteristics bear a simple
and intuitive form. As the entrepreneur’s proportion invested in the project is constant whatever the
bargaining power, her relative strength in the negotiation shows up only in the transfer rate. Given the
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structure of the game, the equilibrium transfer rate is a weighted average of the two extreme values
that bind the corresponding participation constraint. In other terms, each counterparty’s share of the
surplus created by the presence of a VC investor is strictly proportional to their bargaining power.
Such a simple structure appears very useful in light of equation (3), that displays a linear relation
between the transfer rate and the dilution factor in VC investment contracts. It is obvious that the
level of entrepreneur’s dilution in the ownership of the project is an indicator of her bargaining power.
What Proposition 4 shows is that, knowing what is the range of dilution factors acceptable by the
entrepreneur and the investor, the dilution level is directly proportional to their bargaining power.
Proposition 4 can also be viewed as a separation theorem regarding the optimal contract. It shows
that the proportion of wealth invested in the project, S∗ı¯, is only a function of the investor’s risk
premium µı¯−κı¯, the entrepreneur’s risk tolerance, and project risk. This proportion is independent of
η. The subsequent dilution in the entrepreneur’s equity stake is only reflected in the transfer rate τ∗ı¯(η),
which depends on bargaining power. Such a finding holds very strongly. It entails that, whatever the
bargaining power of the entrepreneur, she will invest a larger proportion in the project if its risk is
lower or if her outside wealth is larger (through a concurrent reduction in the risk aversion parameter
γe). Bitler et al. (2005) derive a similar prediction in the context of an agency theory framework. This
is also consistent with the signaling approach of Leland and Pyle (1977). But unlike both streams of
research, our results are derived in a framework of symmetric and homogenous information.
Note that the expected rate of return of the venture, rπ, has strictly no impact on the contracting
preferences. Yet, this rate is relevant as it drives the feasible character of each contract.
4.2.2 Determinants of investor selection
Proposition 4 provides a general framework to compare contracts with the three sources of venture
capital and the initial portfolio. From Table 2, the corporate VC shares one characteristic with the
other two types of investors: it bears the same cost of equity capital as the bank-sponsored VC,
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while it has access to the same riskless rate conditions as the independent VC. Thus, it is logical
to perform two-by-two comparisons with the corporate venture capital fund as one branch of the
alternative, the other branch being (i) the initial financial portfolio, (ii) the independent VC and (iii)
the bank-sponsored VC. These comparisons are done through the following corollaries.13
Corollary 5 If the entrepreneur does not self-finance the venture, she will strictly prefer to contract
with the corporate venture capital investor over her initial portfolio iﬀ
γe > γe ≡ 1− ρ
2
πm
2K(rπ − rf − βπm(rm − rf ))
µ
rm − rf
σm
¶2
.
This Corollary has to be interpreted together with Proposition 1 and Corollary 3. From these two
results, we know that for 0 < γe ≤ γe, the entrepreneur would self-finance the venture (Proposition 1)
but would indeed even prefer to contract with a venture capitalist (Corollary 3). On the other hand,
Corollary 5 tells us that for γe > γe, the entrepreneur would like to contract as well. Thus there would
be no feasible contract if the project is such that γe > γe.
Corollary 6 The entrepreneur will strictly prefer to contract with the corporate over the independent
venture capital investor iﬀ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
µind < µcrp if 12
¡
µind + µcrp
¢
> rf +Kγeσ2π
µind > µcrp if 12
¡
µind + µcrp
¢
< rf +Kγeσ2π
Corollary 6 presents a very counter-intuitive result. To enter a contract, the entrepreneur only
has to verify that her participation constraint is verified. It would be natural to expect that she
would choose the investor i whose cost of equity investment µi is lower, so that binding the investor’s
participation constraint could be done at a cheaper cost and thus the return on investment would be
greater. But a lower µi induces a reduced entrepreneur’s optimal stake in the venture S[e,i] (Proposition
13For simplicity of the exposition, we restrict the analysis to the interior solution S∗i = µ
i−κi
γeσ2π
. The
case where S∗i = K is not very interesting as, from Proposition 4, the analysis boils down to seeking
the investor whose cost of funds κi is the lowest.
21
2). Therefore, µi has opposite impacts on the quantity of invested funds and the rate of return on
this investment. The entrepreneur only prefers the investor with a lower cost of equity if the average
risk premium for the competing venture capital investors — represented by (
µind−rf)+(µcrp−rf )
2 — does
not exceed a risk premium reflecting the risk- and preference-scaled size of the project (the product
Kγeσ2π). The average risk premium reflects the relative importance of the diﬀerence in costs of equity.
If it is high, the absolute diﬀerence in costs of equity matters less for the entrepreneur’s decision. Then,
she cares more about the surplus that can be reaped, represented by the size of the project K. She
prefers to get a higher share S[e,i] proposed in the optimal contract, even though the corresponding
transfer rate τ [e,i] is less attractive. The product γeσ2π adjusts for the risk aversion of the entrepreneur.
The higher the product, the less likely the choice of the investor with the greater value of µi, and the
more important the cost saving eﬀect over the surplus size eﬀect.
In a realistic setup, most projects are such that the eﬀect of project size dominates the inequalities,
so that the project risk premium exceeds the average of the investor’s risk premia. In this case, the
first condition of Corollary 6 holds. Furthermore, because of her disadvantage in diversification, the
independent venture capital investor is likely to have a required return µind that exceeds the one of the
corporate investor. Under such circumstances, the entrepreneur has an incentive to address a corporate
venture capitalist. In order to convince the entrepreneur to contract with her, the independent investor
has two possibilities: (i) to reduce its cost of capital through a large diversification between the
individual venture investments (i.e. reducing βπind), or (ii) to provide an extra rate of return that
compensates for the loss in expected utility resulting from the higher cost of capital.
Corollary 7 The entrepreneur will strictly prefer to contract with the corporate over the bank-sponsored
venture capital investor iﬀ
(i) γeσ2π + rbd > rf + βπm(rm − rf )
or (ii) γeσ2π + rbl < rf + βπm(rm − rf )
or (iii) K (rπ − βπm(rm − rf ))− (K − 1) rf +
(βπm(rm−rf ))
2
2γeσ2π
> rπ − 12γeσ2π.
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Corollary 7 means that if the contract with the bank-sponsored VC fund is not degenerate (cases
(i) and (ii)), then the entrepreneur would never want to contract with the bank-sponsored VC. Only
if the intermediation margin rbl − rbd is high enough, neither of these conditions is satisfied, and the
bank could be freely chosen by the entrepreneur.
Unlike the independent investor studied in Corollary 6, the bank-sponsored venture capital investor
does not have the possibility to weigh on its cost of capital. Thus, if the entrepreneur is dominant in the
relationship, she will probably not knock on the banker’s door to impose a venture capital contract. In
order to induce her to enter such a contract, the banker would have to accept less favorable conditions
than with another venture capital investor. This view is consistent with a dynamic view of the banker-
entrepreneur relationship proposed by Hellmann (2002) in which the banker tries to lock a durable
relationship in order to foster its lending opportunities.
5 Numerical analysis
In this section we illustrate the results implied from Proposition 4 and its Corollaries 6 and 7. To this
end, we need to rely on a base case parametrization that is discussed below.
5.1 Calibration
Entrepreneur’s risk aversion Several contributions propose a methodology for estimating
investor’s attitude towards risk. But we should keep in mind that entrepreneurs should by definition
be less risk averse than average individuals. Tarashev et al. (2003) show that the risk aversion
coeﬃcient implicit from S&P options varies from 0 to 2. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) obtain a
range from 0 to 4.4, but the upper bound decreases to less than 1.3 after removing the five largest
stock return volatility changes. Based on the empirical distribution of terminal payoﬀs from venture-
capital backed projects, Hall and Woodward (2010) induce that a risk aversion coeﬃcient of 2 makes
the entrepreneur indiﬀerent between launching the venture or not. We therefore set γe = 1 for the
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base case and take a value of 2 as an upper limit for our simulations.
Market portfolio We follow Kerins et al. (2004) who estimate an annual standard deviation of
S&P500 index returns of 16.2% over the last 20 years and use a 10% market rate. Therefore, we set
rm = 0.1 and σm = 0.16.
Venture characteristics One way to proxy for K is to divide the value of the venture’s assets
by the book value of entrepreneurs’ equity (interpreted as their historical cost of acquisition of the
project). From Bitler et al. (2005), Table II (who use National Survey of Small Businesses data), this
ratio is worth 2.8 if we take mean values. It remains the same if we take median values.
Gompers and Lerner (1997) study the investments of a single venture capital firm and measure
an average annual return of 30.5% gross of fees from 1972 to 1997. Cochrane (2005) estimates the
arithmetic average returns of his sample venture capital projects at 59%. In their study of venture
capital investments across five European countries, Manigart et al. (2002) obtain estimates of required
returns from early-stage VC investments that range between 36% to 45%. Accordingly, we set rπ =
40%. Kerins et al. (2004) rely on the CAPM to estimate the cost of capital for an entrepreneur.
They find that the average correlation between a sample of 2,623 early stage firms’ equity returns and
S&P500 returns is 0.195. The standard deviation of their sample firms’ equity returns is 102.4% (see
their table 4). Consistent with these figures, the value of βπm is set equal to 0.2 × 100/16 = 1.25.
Dividing the value of the standard deviation of equity returns by the average project size of 2.8, we
finally obtain σπ = 35%.
Cost of intermediation Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) report a net interest margin for G7
countries between 2.03% (Canada) and 4.34% (the U.S.), with an unweighted average of 2.94%. We
use these numbers as a proxy for cost of bank intermediation, which in our model is reflected by
2 |rf − rbf |. Assuming a risk-free rate of rf = 4%, we therefore set rbl = 5.5% and rbd = 2.5%.
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Independent venture capitalist As for the entrepreneur, Kerins et al. (2004) obtain that
her average cost of capital ranges from 31.1% to 57.5% depending on her degree of commitment in
the venture. Assuming these figures also apply to the partially diversified independent VC, we set
rf + βπind (µind − rf ) equal to 30%.
Table 4 summarizes our model calibration.
Insert Table 4 here
5.2 Feasible contracts
Figures 2 and 3 provide numerical illustrations of Proposition 2. The upper and lower bounds for
the optimal transfer are plotted against project characteristics (expected return and volatility) as well
as against entrepreneur’s risk aversion and project’s size relative to entrepreneur’s wealth. Figure 2
reports the case of the corporate VC while Figure 3 reports that of the independent VC (the case of
the bank-sponsored VC is very close to that of the corporate and is therefore not reported).
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
As expected, the higher the project volatility or the higher the entrepreneur’s financial constraint,
the greater room for agreement between the VC and the entrepreneur (i.e. the wider is the band for
the optimal rate of transfer). A similar result holds for entrepreneur’s risk aversion. Note however,
that the space for feasible contracts does not depend on project expected return (see Figures 2a and
3a). Interestingly, if project size gets a bit low (see Figure 3d), then there is no more contracting
possibility between the independent VC and the entrepreneur.
5.3 Investor selection
Figure 4 illustrates the entrepreneur’s contracting preferences highlighted in Proposition 4 and Corol-
laries 6 and 7 as far as investor selection is concerned. Parameters are those of Table 4. For various
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degrees of entrepreneur’s risk aversion, Figure 4 reports the optimal choice of venture capitalist in the
space of project characteristics (K,σπ).
Insert Figure 4 here
Each figure produces the same type of output. Using our base-case parameterization, they show
three types of tendencies: (i) corporate-backed VCs tend to be favored for the riskiest projects, espe-
cially the larger ones; (ii) independent VC funds tend to invest in the least risky projects, irrespective
of their size, and in the smallest projects, irrespective of their risk; and (iii) bank-sponsored VC
investors have a window of large, middle-risk projects.
Such findings are broadly in line with the empirical literature devoted to the determination of VC
adequacy to project types. On a pure U.S. sample, Hellmann et al. (2008) find that bank-dependent
VCs invest less often in early rounds and they engage more in larger deals than other types of VC firms.
These authors posit an underlying explanation related to relationship banking. The bank-sponsored
VC is supposed to try to invest in firms in which the entrepreneurs may demand loans in the future.
In their study on a detailed sample of German VC-backed companies, Hirsch and Walz (2006) also
conclude that venture capital investors that are not backed by a bank tend to finance more innovative
projects. Mayer et al. (2005) carry out an empirical investigation on four countries (Germany, Israel,
Japan and the U.K.). Using a granular classification of VC investor types on the basis of funding
sources, they find robust evidence that corporate and independent VCs prefer to invest in early-stage
projects, typically characterized by high risk and/or low size. By contrast, funds whose funding comes
from banks, insurance companies and pension funds favor late-stage projects. Although each country’s
financial system widely diﬀers in their sample, they do not find any evidence that these diﬀerences
explain observed variations in funding sources in their sample. Note that all empirical predictions focus
on the dichotomization between bank and non-bank sponsored investors. Beyond the large consistency
of our predictions with this stream of literature, we also bring a rationale for a strong segmentation
of project financing between corporate and independent VC funds.
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Besides evidence on project segmentation by investor type, the comparison of the graphs in Fig-
ure 4 reflects the influence of risk aversion on VC investor choice. The eﬀect of an increase in the
entrepreneur’s risk aversion on the likelihood of contracting with the independent and corporate is
clear-cut. Whatever the distribution of project size and risk, and considering the pure eﬀect of a
change in the representative entrepreneur’s risk aversion, a more risk averse entrepreneur (i.e. higher
γe) ends up being more likely to contract with a corporate VC investor than with an independent
one. The impact on the bank-sponsored VC investor is less obvious. The lower and the upper bound
of the zone of bank-sponsored fund contracting preference both increase with the level of risk as risk
aversion increases. Therefore, if project risk is relatively high, a greater risk aversion will lead to a
greater likelihood of a bank-sponsored VC implication. The opposite holds for low levels of project
risk. More risk averse investors would then tend to look for an independent VC fund rather than a
bank-sponsored one.
Table 5 clarifies the relation between the likelihood of contracting with the bank-sponsored VC
and the entrepreneur’s risk aversion for diﬀerent levels of project size and risk. It shows the evolution
of the relative market shares for the three types of investors as K and σπ gradually increase.14
Insert Table 5 here
As shown in Table 5, the bank-sponsored VC market shares increase with entrepreneur’s risk aversion
coeﬃcient (across all project sizes and risks) for small values of γe. However, this behavior is reversed
for high values of γe.
Insert Figure 5 here
Figure 5 provides an additional illustration of Corollaries 6 and 7. It shows the diﬀerence in surplus
between the corporate VC contract and the independent VC contract (Figure 5a) and between the
corporate VC contract and the bank-sponsored VC contract (Figure 5b). With parameters as given
as in Table 4, we obtain µcrp = 0.115 < µind = 0.3. As stated by Corollary 6, the entrepreneur will
14To keep calculations simple, we assume a uniform distribution of projects across size and risk.
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prefer contracting with the independent VC as long as
1
2
³
µind + µcrp
´
> rf +Kγ
eσ2π,
which is true for small values of K and/or small values of σπ. But as project size and/or project risk
increase, the former condition will not hold anymore and preference will be given to the corporate
VC, as shown by Figure 5a.
Similarly, parameters of Table 4 induce that S∗ < 1 and the bank will oﬀer a deposit account at
rate rbd. According to Corollary 7 part (i), the entrepreneur will prefer the corporate VC contract
over the bank-sponsored VC contract iﬀ
γeσ2π + rbd > rf + βπm(rm − rf ),
which translates into a lower bound condition for project risk, as shown by Figure 5b.
Note that the magnitude of surplus diﬀerence is much smaller between the corporate VC and the
bank-sponsored VC (Figure 5b) than between the corporate VC and the independent VC (Figure
5a). Combined with the empirical evidence quoted above, this might indicate that the main source
of reported diﬀerences between the use of financing sources arises because of the bank-sponsored vs.
independent VC dichotomy. When matched with the independent VC fund, the bank and corporate
investor types look very much alike. From the pure funding cost approach that we adopt, the most
adequate approach to clustering venture capital types should probably be a distinction "independent
versus bank and corporate", while empirical papers have mostly adopted a "independent and corporate
versus bank" type of approach.
5.4 Dilution factor
In this subsection we analyze the endogenous dilution factor as obtained from the optimal transfer
rate from Proposition 4 and retrieved from equation (3). Figure 6 displays the dilution factor in the
(K,σ) space. As far as the base case is concerned, the venture is financed by a bank-sponsored VC
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and the optimal transfer rate is 1.34, which is equivalent to a dilution factor of 3.07.
Insert Figure 6 here
We see that contracting with the independent VC yields a dilution factor of one. When dealing
with the bank-sponsored VC, the entrepreneur obtains a favorable (i.e. strictly greater than one)
dilution factor that is convex in project size and relatively constant in project risk. Finally, with the
corporate VC, the endogenous dilution factor becomes linear in both project size and project risk.
6 Empirical analysis
Even though they bring some geographical variety in their sample, Mayer et al. (2005) confess that
their results regarding the determinants of financing choice remain puzzling in that "a large proportion
of variation within as well as between countries is unrelated to sources of finance. Moreover, diﬀerences
in the relation between funding source and VC activity are unrelated to the country’s financial systems."
A potential solution of this puzzle is provided by the link that exists between the prevailing level of risk
aversion on a given market and the partitioning of investments by VC type. For the same spectrum of
projects, a country in which risk aversion is stronger witnesses greater investment opportunities seized
by corporate VC investors, less by independent VC investors, and more or less by bank-sponsored
funds, depending on the distribution of project size and risk as discussed in the previous section.
The aim of this section is to test some of the main predictions of the model. We focus on the
influence of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion as this dimension has, to our knowledge, not yielded any
specific predictions regarding financing choices in the literature to date. We first confront our model-
inferred project characteristics with country-level evidence. Next, we investigate the link between
entrepreneur’s risk aversion and VC investor type contracting preferences. Finally, we analyze the
model implications in terms of VC stage financing.
We carry out the analysis on a panel of European countries. Yearly fund flows between 2002 and
2009 are obtained from the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA). Thanks to the aggregation
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of country-specific data performed at the level of the EVCA, this sample benefits from a homogenous
data collection methodology and classification. Furthermore, the categorization proposed by the
EVCA focuses on the funding sources and not on the allocation of actual investment by VC type. The
latter approach would classify funds around their organizational structure and control rights. As we
diﬀerentiate investors solely on the basis of the costs of their funding sources, an organizational or
control-based partitioning would not be justified.
Consistent with previous empirical evidence by Mayer et al. (2005) on European data, but also
on our interpretation of bank-sponsored investors, we consider that banks, insurance companies and
pension funds constitute a homogenous group under the umbrella of "bank-sponsored" investors. In-
dependent VC investors gather sources from individuals, family oﬃces and capital markets. Corporate
VC investors encompass all other sources except the ones coming from public authorities, namely cor-
porations, academic institutions, endowments and foundations, funds of funds, other asset managers,
and others. Because governments are not counted but represent a substantial level and variability, the
sum of bank-sponsored, independent and corporate VC types is inferior to one and enjoys considerable
variation over country and time.
The estimation of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion coeﬃcient on each market relies on an approxi-
mation using stock market data. This approach is justifiable by the fact that the representative stock
market investor’s risk aversion reflects the risk attitudes of an equity investor. Even though this is
presumably a strongly downward biased estimator for the overall population, it may be a reasonable
proxy for the risk tolerance of the actual entrepreneur. This is the population under review in our
study, since we are only interested in contracting preferences for actual venture investments. Following
Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004), yearly risk aversion coeﬃcients of the representative agent are esti-
mated by regressing daily stock index returns on the changes in the daily VIX (or equivalent) implied
volatility index:
Rct ' −γc,T∆V IXct + εct, (12)
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where index c stands for the country under consideration, T is the calendar year of the regression,
and γc,T is the estimator for the representative agent’s relative risk aversion coeﬃcient.
15 Daily stock
market data is collected from Thomson Financial Datastream for the 2001-2009. For this time period,
only seven European markets display complete and continuous series for implied volatility indices: the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria. We discard
the latter two countries because of too little liquidity on their stock market and lack of representativity
of the venture capital investments during the period under study. The panel we create features five
countries, which are the top five European countries by fundraising for the period 2005-2009.16 Taking
the most active countries represents the best guarantee of having a reliable connection between the
domestic market-implied risk aversion coeﬃcient and the type of VC activity, be it domestic or foreign,
originating from the same countries.
In order to enhance the significance of the empirical analyses, we perform the analysis on a two-
year average risk aversion coeﬃcient, thereby losing the first observation. This leaves us with a panel
of 40 observations (8 years × 5 countries). The descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in
Table 6.
Insert Table 6 here
Panel A presents the estimation results from equation (12). The results are of the same order as
those of Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) on U.S. data. They report a sample average of 0.40 as well.
This is also in the same neighborhood, although slightly inferior, to the values obtained for the U.S.,
the U.K. and Germany, with a diﬀerent methodology, by Tarashev et al. (2003) on a 1995-2002 time
window. As expected, these values are much lower than the typical risk aversion estimates obtained
in studies of the whole economy (see Bliss and Panigirtzoglou, 2004, for an overview).
15Adding an intercept to Bliss and Panigirtzoglou’s initial specification improves the fit, even though
its estimate is never significant in our sample. The RRA estimate reflects the absolute risk aversion
coeﬃcient for a normalized wealth of 1, as in our setup.
16Funding sources by country of management. See the EVCA Yearbooks from 2006 to 2010 for
details.
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Because we allocate a substantial fraction of funding sources to the bank-sponsored category, Panel
B shows a dominance of that particular source of funds across time and countries. Nevertheless, we
observe a large variability for all three independent variables, both cross-sectionally and over time. The
correlations reported in Panel C indicate a large negative value between the proportion of independent
invested funds, wind, and the risk aversion coeﬃcient. The other correlations are moderate, except
between bank and corporate VC funds, which appear largely substitutes. This observation is consistent
with our analysis of surplus in the preceding section, that showed a relatively small dichotomization
between these two types of funding sources regarding the level of economic gain to extract from the
contract.
6.1 Project risk and size characteristics
As a first check of our theoretical model, we first examine the risk and size profile of VC-backed
projects as a function of the country-specific level of risk aversion. Using the median value for the
estimated risk aversion coeﬃcient per country, we can use our model to retrieve the range of project
risk (σπ) and project size (K) that are consistent with the observed median shares of VC fund raising
per investor type.17 Results can be visualized in Figure 7.
Insert Figure 7 here
The model predicts that the most risky projects are undertaken in the United Kingdom while the
least risky ones are in the French economy. There is little variation in the project minimal size across
countries. However, the biggest ventures appear to be financed in the Netherlands and in the U.K.
Next, we independently gather information on the types of usage of the funds gathered. Until 2007,
the EVCA classified VC funds on the basis of "expected allocation of funds raised" by stage (early
stage/expansion-development) and by technological focus (high-tech/non high-tech). We aggregate the
global funding by country from 2002 to 2007. We proxy for the importance of larger size projects by
17We perform the matching under the assumption of a uniform distribution for project risk and size.
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using the proportion of funds directed to expansion-development projects. Likewise, the proxy for the
importance of riskier projects by using, within the expansion-development projects, the proportion of
funds directed to high-tech projects. The results, together with the numerical translation of Figure 7,
are reported in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 here
With such a limited sample size and as the figures result from successive approximations, it is not
possible to perform statistical inference from this table. Nevertheless, the comparison of risk and size
figures delivers an insightful impression of common variations. The correlation between the High-Tech
figures and the estimated upper bounds of the rectangles, σmaxπ , is 26.4%. Similarly, the correlation
between the Expansion-Development values and Kmax is 46.8%. By contrast, the correlations between
σmaxπ and Exp.-Dev. and between K
max and High-Tech are -1.8% and 0.1%, respectively. Even though
this analysis does not constitute statistical evidence, it suggests that there could be some link between
the proportions of fund sources and the types of investments performed with these funds. According
to our model, this link is influenced by the level of risk aversion specific to each country. This claim
is to be formally tested in the next sub-sections.
6.2 Choice of investor type
We now turn our attention to the direct impact of risk aversion on the choice of investor type.
Naturally, the causal relationship to test is whether the entrepreneur’s decision to contract with a
given investor type depends on her level of risk aversion. But through a multiple regression setup, we
can assess the likelihood of choosing each investor type simultaneously based upon the entrepreneur’s
attitude towards risk. To this end, perform a multiple linear regression of estimated risk aversion
coeﬃcients on fund flows for each type of VC.
The equation to test is
γc,T = γ0 +
X
i=ind,crp,bnk
biwi;c,T + controls+ ηc,T . (13)
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We run three panel regressions. The first two are basic ones without any control variable or with a
single time dummy corresponding to the 2006-07 period, during which there was a significant upward
jump of risk aversion across all European markets. The third panel regression accounts for potential
sources of geographical heterogeneity within each investor type. We introduce interaction variables
representing the product of one or several country dummies with the proportion of VC funding corre-
sponding to each investor type: controls = γ001{c=c1 or c2 or...}+
P
i=ind,crp,bnk b
0
iwi;c,T1{c=c1 or c2 or...}.
18
For each investor type, there are 30 possible combinations. Therefore, we optimize the specification
by maximizing the Schwarz information criterion.
The results are reported in Table 8. The basic panel regression results return a negative and
significant coeﬃcient for the independent VC category. This is the expected sign from the comparative
statics analysis of the previous section. In all countries under consideration, there is a tendency for
entrepreneurs to solicitate less funding from independent VC funds than from other sources when the
risk aversion level increases. This "flight to VC safety" phenomenon does not explain, however, to
whom then entrepreneurs preferably turn to. The significance level achieved from this basic regression
reaches a very high level, with a panel-adjusted R-squared above 57%.
Insert Table 8 here
The optimized panel regression setup enables us to account for country-specific (or zone-specific)
impacts in the relation. The level and significance of the coeﬃcient of independent VC source get
stronger, and there is no country-specific eﬀect. The coeﬃcient corporate VC financing becomes
positive, but insignificant, and with a negative country-specific adjustment for Switzerland. The most
noticeable improvement comes from the bank-sponsored VC investor coeﬃcient. We obtain a common
positive and strongly significant value for France, Germany and Switzerland.19 For these countries, we
emphasize a clear substitution eﬀect from independent to bank-sponsored funds when the market risk
18Other potential determinants of risk aversion levels include the industrial structure and the pro-
portion of foreign investments for each country. Nevertheless equation (13) does not reflect a causal
relationship, and there is no theoretical reason to include such eﬀects in the estimation.
19From our numerical analysis in Table 5, and given the range of estimated risk aversion para-
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aversion changes. In the Netherlands and the U.K., i.e. more market-oriented countries, there is no
clear diﬀerentiation from the corporate and bank-sponsored funding source as a response to a change
in entrepreneur’s risk attitudes. A positive coeﬃcient for the bank-sponsored VC fund is also in line
with a quite low average project risk but high size, which is typically the type of projects that attract
venture capital investment in Europe.
The significance level of this optimized regression is above 69%, which is an outstanding figure
given the fact that the independent variable itself results from a first-pass estimation. Therefore our
results stand as strong evidence supporting our approach. They shed new light on the disappointment
raised by the Mayer et al. (2005) study, because they had not specifically tested the influence of risk
aversion on VC funding choices.
We view the reasons for this strong significance as being related to the parsimony of informational
assumptions underlying our model. In our setup, the investor choice is only driven by funding cost
considerations, which are readily observable. Explanations related to information asymmetries rest
upon eﬀort or added-value estimations, which are essentially forward looking and thus harder to
assess. Before looking at diﬀerential eﬀects related to these dimensions, our approach provides a
background contracting framework that emphasizes core financial contracting decision criteria.
6.3 Venture stage financing
Although our model is one-period, it is possible to generate predictions regarding stage financing if we
re-calibrate it to diﬀerent phases of the venture development. There is clear evidence (see e.g. Kerins
et al., 2004) that project risk decreases with the age of the venture. On the other hand, some papers
document a risk of exit as the venture is completing the late stage financing and is looking for access
to financial markets (see Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004, for a detailed list of examples of risks related to
financial market and exit conditions). Cumming et al. (2005) for instance show that late-stage firms
meters (0.06-0.8), our model predicts a positive relation between bank-sponsored VC fund flow and
entrepreneur’s risk aversion.
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suﬀer from venture capitalists divesture when exit markets are illiquid. We therefore conjecture a
U-shaped relation between project risk and development stage. In addition, we can safely assume that
project size and entrepreneur’s financial constraint increases with development stage. Accordingly,
Figure 8 plots the paths in the space (K,σπ) that a venture will typically follow through its diﬀerent
stages.
Insert Figure 8 here
As shown by Figure 8, our model predicts that when entrepreneur’s risk aversion is low, early stage
will typically be financed by the corporate VC. Expansion and late stages are likely to be financed by
the corporate VC also or by the bank-sponsored VC. Financing from the independent VC is unlikely,
except maybe for the last stage.
By contrast, when entrepreneur’s risk aversion is high, early stage will typically be financed by the
independent VC. Expansion and late stages are likely to be financed by the bank-sponsored VC or by
the independent VC. Financing from the corporate VC is unlikely, except maybe for the last stage.
With the same panel as before, we test whether the relative importance of investment stage in an
economy at a given point in time is reflected in the weight of each investor type. We conjecture that
this responsiveness depends on the prevailing level of risk aversion. The weight of diﬀerent investment
stage is obtained by gathering EVCA data on the expected allocation of funds raised by country and
by year. We distinguish early stage, expansion-development, and every other use which is identified
as late.20 We exclude LBO funds from the analysis.
We first use the full panel of data and test whether the value wi;c,T depends on the risk aversion
coeﬃcient, the proportion of early stage funds, and the proportion of expansion-development funds.21
Next, we split the sample in two sub-samples of equal size based on the level of risk aversion, and
perform the same regression. To control for diﬀerences in average values of risk aversion coeﬃcient
20The EVCA provided more details about types of late-stage investments in 2008.
21We did not include the late stage proportion in the regression for collinearity reasons.
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from one sub-sample to the other, we center this variable around its mean. The equation to test is:
wi;c,T = intercept+ λ1
¡
γc,T − γ¯
¢
+ λ2 (Early Stage)c,T + λ3 (Exp.-Dev.)c,T + νc,T . (14)
The results of the regression are presented in Table 9. We do not report the results for wind;c,T as
none of them are significant.
Insert Table 9 here
We mostly emphasize a substitution eﬀect between the corporate and the bank-sponsored investor.
The results for the full sample confirm that the funds originating from corporate investors are more
likely to be used for early stage projects. The eﬀect is opposite for the bank. The low risk aversion sub-
sample does not deliver statistically significant coeﬃcients for either investor type. However the results
become very significant for the high risk aversion sub-sample. We get evidence of two phenomena: (i)
the tendency to finance preferably early stage projects with corporate VC funds is reinforced, and (ii)
the "flight to VC quality" emphasized before primarily leads to transacting with the bank-sponsored
VC, as indicated by the signs of the risk aversion coeﬃcients. This latter finding also explains why we
find a larger tendency to prefer bank-sponsored funds when the risk aversion coeﬃcient increases, as
already evidenced in Table 8.
7 Conclusion
Between the fundamental risk-return trade-oﬀ analyzed in equilibrium models such as the CAPM,
and the practical considerations surrounding the determination of the cost of capital for the venture
capitalist and the entrepreneur, this paper has provided a theoretical building block adapted to the
context of venture investments. Even though the analytical framework that we propose is relatively
simple and does not require stringent assumptions, we can characterize the entrepreneurial choices
and the relations with the investors in an insightful manner. We have been able to uncover a number
of strong results that hold irrespective of the numerous externalities characterizing the market for
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new ventures. In particular, we emphasize the desirability of the investment relation between the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, and the link between contracting choices and design with the
cost components of the investor’s capital and her bargaining power with the entrepreneur.
The theoretical model developed in this paper shows that, without entering into a cost-benefit
analysis of the impact of the venture capitalist’s intervention on corporate value creation, the simple
risk transfer opportunity given to the entrepreneur by the venture capital relationship is powerful
enough to induce her to transact with a profesional investor. Besides, we emphasize the impact that
a simple market imperfection, namely diﬀerential costs of capital, can have on contract choices and
design. The role of the entrepreneur’s risk aversion level is particularly important in our analysis. To
our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly relates the entrepreneur’s risk tolerance to her
contracting choice. Such a link delivers testable hypotheses, and our tests, despite the limited sample
size and the sucessful approximations made necessary by the empirical design, confirm our conjectures
to a large extent. Not only this brings a potential building block on the literature analyzing the
determinants of investor’s choice, but it also contributes to solving a puzzle regarding the geographical
variations in venture capital activity.
The limitations that this study suﬀers from are numerous, but they are inherent to its style and
scope. As we propose a theoretical model that aims at determining equilibrium relationships, the
real-life imperfections that surround the venture capital are out of its scope. We are not unaware of
them however. Adverse selection and agency cost considerations aﬀect, and probably dominate, the
venture capital relationship. Frictions such as liquidity constraints and investment size or stage have
a very strong impact on the venturer’s investment choices and, more importantly, on the hurdle rate
assigned to the portfolio. We believe that these important, but diﬀerent influences do not restrain the
relevance of the kind of study we propose. They simply call for a controlled empirical investigation to
assess their adequacy and their practical importance.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The indiﬀerence point for adopting the venture is Ueπ = U
e
φ, which yields given equations (1) and (2)
2γeK (rπ − rf )− γe2K2σ2π =
µ
µφ − rf
σφ
¶2
.
Solutions are:
γe1 =
(rπ − rf )−
r
(rπ − rf )2 − σ2π
³
µφ−rf
σφ
´2
Kσ2π
γe2 =
(rπ − rf ) +
r
(rπ − rf )2 − σ2π
³
µφ−rf
σφ
´2
Kσ2π
The venture is self-financed for γe ∈ [γe1, γe2] . Condition γe > γe1 is satisfied under conditions (C1) and
(C2). Indeed, any real positive numbers a and b such that a > b verify
√
a2 − b2 > a− b. Hence, using
conditions (C1) and (C2),
γe1 <
µφ − rf
Kσπσφ
<
µφ − rf
σ2φ
= γe.
Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3
First we characterize the entrepreneur’s share of investment in case of any contract between e and
i. It can take two generic forms, depending on who has the bargaining power (and thus maximizes
utility):
S∗i,ke = argmax
S
U i(S, τ) s.t. Ue(S, τ) = ke
or S∗e,ki = argmax
S
Ue(S, τ) s.t. U i(S, τ) = ki.
Binding the constraint at τ∗i,ke (for the first program) or τ∗e,ki (for the second program) and
replacing its value in the utility function to maximize yields
S∗i,ke = argmax
S
∙
−ke +K
¡
rπ − µi
¢
+ (1− S)κi + Sµi − 1
2
γeS2σ2π
¸
S∗e,ki = argmax
S
∙
−ki +K
¡
rπ − µi
¢
+ (1− S)κi + Sµi − 1
2
γeS2σ2π
¸
.
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As both programs are quadratic functions of S and only diﬀer with a constant, applying the FOC
yields the same value:
arg
S
µ
∂U i(S, τ∗i,ke)
∂S
= 0
¶
= arg
S
µ
∂Ue(S, τ∗e,ki)
∂S
= 0
¶
=
µi − κi
γeσ2π
.
Because U i(S) is increasing and then decreasing, and since the value of S is bounded above by K,
we obtain the optimal level of entrepreneur’s investment as
S∗i = S∗i,ke = S∗e,ki = min
µ
µi − κi
γeσ2π
,K
¶
.
The condition for the existence of an optimal contract simply follows from binding the participation
constraint for the extreme cases. For the entrepreneur-dominant case, we set
ki = 0 =⇒ τ [e,i] = κi +
K − S∗i
1− S∗i
£
rπ − µi
¤
.
For the investor-dominant case, we get the entrepreneur’s participation constraint ke = Ueφ,π =
max
³
Ueφ, U
e
π
´
and
ke = Ueφ,π =⇒ τ [i,e] =
Ueφ,π − S∗irπ + 12γe
¡
S∗i
¢2 σ2π
(1− S∗i) .
The determination of µi and κi for investors i = ind (the independent) and i = crp (the corporate)
is straightforward as they can only take one value.
For investor bnk (the bank-sponsored VC), the function U b(S, τ) is piecewise linear. So, function
Ue(S, τ∗bnk), that writes
Ue(S, τ∗bnk) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
K
¡
rπ − µbnk
¢
+ (1− S)rbl + S (rf + βπm(rm − rf ))− 12γeS2σ2π if S > 1
K
¡
rπ − µbnk
¢
+ (1− S)rbd + S (rf + βπm(rm − rf ))− 12γeS2σ2π otherwise
,
with µbnk > rbl > rbd, is piecewise quadratic in S, with the same FOC as before. Three cases are to
be distinguished:
(i) if rf +βπm(rm−rf )−rbd > rf +βπm(rm−rf )−rbl ≥ γeσ2π, then S[e,bnk] ≥ 1 (lending situation)
and the prevailing rate is rbf = rbl;
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(ii) if γeσ2π ≥ rf + βπm(rm − rf ) − rbd > rf + βπm(rm − rf ) − rbl, then S[e,bnk] ≤ 1 (borrowing
situation) and the prevailing rate is rbf = rbd;
(iii) if rf + βπm(rm − rf )− rbd > γeσ2π > rf + βπm(rm − rf )− rbl, then the local optima S
[e,bnk]
l =
rf+βπm(rm−rf )−rbl
γeσ2π
< 1 and S[e,bnk]d =
rf+βπm(rm−rf )−rbd
γeσ2π
> 1, corresponding to the two quadratic
segments of the utility function, are not compatible with the domain of rbl and rbd, respectively.
In this case, as Ue(S, τ∗bnk) is piecewise quadratic and has a negative coeﬃcient in S2, the global
maximum of this function is S[e,bnk] = 1 which is a degenerate case where there is no transfer between
the entrepreneur and the investor.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first solve the nested objective function
max
S∗i(η),τ∗i(η)
G(S∗i(η), τ∗i(η); η)
for a particular investor i.
First note that, from Proposition 2, the optimal entrepreneur’s share in the venture is the same
for any contract with a given investor, therefore S∗i(η) = S∗i. Since we assume the contract to be
non-degenerate, S∗i < K. The only variable that drives the optimal contract as a function of the
bargaining power is the transfer rate τ∗i.
Taking the log of the nested objective function, applying the FOC and rearranging yields
τ∗i(η) = arg
©
η
£
U i(S∗i, τ∗i)
¤
− (1− η)
£
Ue(S∗i, τ∗i)− Ueφ,π
¤
= 0
ª
Equations (6) and (5) provide the values of U i and Ue, respectively. This gives a linear equation
in τ∗i whose solution is given by
τ∗i(η) = η
∙
κi +
K − S∗i
1− S∗i (rπ − µ
i)
¸
+ (1− η)
"
Ueφ,π − S∗irπ + 12γe
¡
S∗i
¢2 σ2π
1− S∗i
#
,
where the first expression between brackets equals τ [e,i] and the second one equals τ [i,e] from Propo-
sition 2. We easily check that the second order condition is satisfied.
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To solve the global problem at the equilibrium transfer rate τ∗i(η)
max
i=ind,crp,bnk
G(S∗i, τ∗i(η)),
we note that, from equation (6), and noting that U i(S∗i, τ [e,i]) = 0 by definition, we get:
U i(S∗i, τ∗i(η)) = U i(S∗i, τ∗i(η))− U i(S∗i, τ [e,i])
=
¡
K − S∗i
¢
(rπ − µi)−
¡
1− S∗i
¢ ¡
τ∗i(η)− κi
¢
−
h¡
K − S∗i
¢
(rπ − µi)−
¡
1− S∗i
¢ ³
τ [e,i] − κi
´i
=
¡
1− S∗i
¢ ³
τ [e,i] − τ∗i(η)
´
=
¡
1− S∗i
¢
(1− η)
³
τ [e,i] − τ [i,e]
´
.
Similarly, applying equation (5) and using the fact that Ueφ = U
e(S∗i, τ [i,e]), we get
Ue(S∗i, τ∗i(η))− Ueφ = Ue(S∗i, τ∗i(η))− Ue(S∗i, τ [i,e])
= τ∗i(η) + S∗i
¡
rπ − τ∗i(η)
¢
− 1
2
γe
¡
S∗i
¢2
σ2π
−
∙
τ [i,e] + S∗i
³
rπ − τ [i,e]
´
− 1
2
γe
¡
S∗i
¢2
σ2π
¸
=
¡
1− S∗i
¢ ³
τ∗i(η)− τ [i,e]
´
=
¡
1− S∗i
¢
η
³
τ [e,i] − τ [i,e]
´
.
Hence, the global maximization problem simplifies to
max
i=ind,crp,bnk
G(S∗i, τ∗i(η)) = max
i=ind,crp,bnk
¡
1− S∗i
¢ ³
τ [e,i] − τ [i,e]
´
.
From the definitions of τ [e,i] and τ [i,e] provided in Proposition 2, the preferred investor type verifies
ı¯ = argmax
i=ind,crp,bnk
∙
κi
¡
1− S∗i
¢
+
¡
K − S∗i
¢
(rπ − µi)−
µ
Ueφ,π − S∗irπ +
1
2
γe
¡
S∗i
¢2
σ2π
¶¸
.
Using the fact that S∗i = µ
i−κi
γeσ2π
if the contract is not degenerate, removing all terms that are inde-
pendent of i and rearranging yields
ı¯ = argmax
i=ind,crp,bnk
Ã
κi −Kµi +
¡
µi − κi
¢2
2γeσ2π
!
,
which completes the proof.
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Proof of Corollaries 5, 6 and 7
(i) To induce a shift from the entrepreneur’s initial financial portfolio φ to a venture capital contract,
the most favorable (i.e. entrepreneur-dominant) contract with the corporate VC must exceed the
entrepreneur’s participation constraint, that is:
Ue(S[e,crp], τ [e,crp]) > Ueφ,π.
or, from Propositions 1 and 2, replacing µcrp = rf + βπm(rm − rf ) and κcrp = rf
K (rπ − rf − βπm(rm − rf )) +
1
2γe
µ
βπm(rm − rf )
σπ
¶2
>
1
2γe
µ
rm − rf
σm
¶2
.
By the definition of beta, we get that βπmσπ =
ρπm
σm
, so the expression simplifies to
γe >
1− ρ2πm
2K(rπ − rf − βπm(rm − rf ))
µ
rm − rf
σm
¶2
,
which proves Corollary 5.
(ii) Similarly, to induce the entrepreneur to opt for the corporate VC instead of the independent
VC, the following condition must be respected:
Ue(S[e,crp], τ [e,crp]) > Ue(S[e,ind], τ [e,ind]),
i.e.
K (rπ − µcrp) + rf + 12γe
³
µcrp−rf
σπ
´2
> K
¡
rπ − µind
¢
+ rf + 12γe
³
µind−rf
σπ
´2
⇔ K
¡
µind − µcrp
¢
− 12γe
∙³
µind−rf
σπ
´2
−
³
µcrp−rf
σπ
´2¸
> 0
⇔ K
¡
µind − µcrp
¢
− 1
2γeσ2π
£¡¡
µind − rf
¢
+ (µcrp − rf )
¢ ¡¡
µind − rf
¢
− (µcrp − rf )
¢¤
> 0
⇔ K
¡
µind − µcrp
¢
− 1
2γeσ2π
£¡¡
µind − rf
¢
+ (µcrp − rf )
¢ ¡
µind − µcrp
¢¤
> 0
⇔
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
rf +Kγeσ2π <
1
2
¡
µind + µcrp
¢
if µind < µcrp
rf +Kγeσ2π >
1
2
¡
µind + µcrp
¢
if µind > µcrp
.
(iii) Finally, to induce the entrepreneur to opt for the corporate VC instead of the bank-sponsored
VC, the following condition must be respected:
Ue(S[e,crp], τ [e,crp]) > Ue(S[e,bnk], τ [e,bnk]).
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Three cases have to be distinguished:
Case 1: γeσ2π + rbd > rf + βπm(rm − rf ). Then, from Proposition 2, S[e,bnk] = µ
bnk−κbnk
γeσ2π
< 1 and
rbf = rbd. The condition writes:
K (rπ − µcrp) + rf + 12γe
³
µcrp−rf
σπ
´2
> K
¡
rπ − µbnk
¢
+ rbd + 12γe
³
µbnk−rbd
σπ
´2
⇔ rf − rbd − 12γe
∙³
µind−rbd
σπ
´2
−
³
µbnk−rf
σπ
´2¸
> 0
⇔ rf − rbd − 12γeσ2π
£¡¡
µbnk − rbd
¢
+ (µcrp − rf )
¢ ¡¡
µbnk − rbd
¢
− (µcrp − rf )
¢¤
> 0
⇔ rf − rbd − 12γeσ2π
£¡¡
µbnk − rbd
¢
+ (µcrp − rf )
¢
(rf − rbd)
¤
> 0
⇔ 1− 1γeσ2π
£
rf + βπm(rm − rf )− 12 (rf + rbd)
¤
> 0.
⇔ 1− 12
¡
S[e,bnk] + S[e,crp]
¢
> 0
which is always true as S[e,crp] < S[e,bnk] < 1.
Case 2: γeσ2π + rbl < rf + βπm(rm − rf ). Then S[e,bnk] = µ
bnk−κbnk
γeσ2π
> 1 and rbf = rbl. The proof is
similar to the one of Case 1.
Case 3: γeσ2π + rbd < rf + βπm(rm − rf ) < γeσ2π + rbl. From Proposition 2, the contract with
the bank-sponsored VC is degenerate with S[e,bnk] = 1 and Ue(S[e,bnk], τ [e,bnk]) = rπ − 12γeσ2π. The
expression follows.
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Tables
Table 1: Characteristics of investor types.
Type of venture capital sponsor Independent Corporate Bank
Profit-maximizer X X X
Diversified shareholders × X X
Financial intermediary × × X
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Table 2: Shares in total funds raised by investor type in the U.S. and Europe.
Classification Investor type U.S. (%) Europe (%)
"Corporate" Funds of funds 18.8
Endowments and foundations 21.0 3.3
Corporate Investors 2.0 5.9
Total 23.0 28.0
"Bank-sponsored" Banks 25.0 21.6
Insurance companies 13.0
Pension funds 42.0 28.8
Total 67.0 63.4
"Independent" Private Individuals 10.0 8.6
Source: The European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and the National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA). Funding sources coming from government agencies and unidentified sources were left out. U.S. data
are for year 2003. European data are for years 2002-2006 (average).
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Table 3: Characteristics of investors’ utility maximization.
µi κi
Corporate rf + βπm(rm − rf ) rf
Independent rf + βπind(rind − rf ) rf
Bank rf + βπm(rm − rf ) rbd or rbl
Note: µi represents the cost of equity investment. κi represents the rate of lending (if S > 1) or borrowing
(if S < 1) available to the investor.
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Table 4: List of calibrated parameters.
Parameter Notation Value
Entrepreneur Risk aversion coeﬃcient γe 1∗
Market portfolio Expected return rm 0.10
Standard deviation σm 0.16
Venture Expected return rπ 0.40∗
Standard deviation σπ 0.35∗
Beta βπm 1.25
Size K 3∗
Cost of intermediation Risk-free rate rf 0.04
Bank loan rate rbl 0.055
Bank deposit rate rbd 0.025
Independent VC Cost of capital µind 0.30
Table 4 summarizes the base case calibration. Risk aversion coeﬃcient is made consistent with estimates
from Tarashev et al. (2003), Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) as well as Hall and Woodward (2010). Market
portfolio parameters are derived from Kerins et al. (2004). Venture characteristics are obtained from Bitler et
al. (2005), Gompers and Lerner (1997), Cochrane (2005), Manigart et al. (2002) as well as Kerins et al. (2004).
Cost of intermediation is inferred from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004). Cost of capital for the independent venture
capital is obtained from Kerins et al. (2004). Parameters marked with a star are varying in our simulations
analysis.
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Table 5: Market share changes for the bank-sponsored VC investor.
Panel A: Risk aversion coeﬃcient shifts from 0.1 to 1
K ≤ 2 K ≤ 3 K ≤ 4 K ≤ 5 K ≤ 6
σπ ≤ 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
σπ ≤ 0.2 0 0 0 +0.013 +0.039
σπ ≤ 0.3 0 +0.049 +0.113 +0.167 +0.213
σπ ≤ 0.4 0 +0.036 +0.084 +0.125 +0.158
σπ ≤ 0.5 0 +0.029 +0.067 +0.099 +0.126
Panel B: Risk aversion coeﬃcient shifts from 1 to 2
K ≤ 2 K ≤ 3 K ≤ 4 K ≤ 5 K ≤ 6
σπ ≤ 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
σπ ≤ 0.2 0 +0.046 +0.112 +0.157 +0.178
σπ ≤ 0.3 0 −0.014 −0.033 −0.049 −0.062
σπ ≤ 0.4 0 −0.010 −0.024 −0.036 −0.046
σπ ≤ 0.5 0 −0.008 −0.019 −0.029 −0.037
This table reports the change in the number of instances where the optimal investor type is the bank-
sponsored VC as entrepreneur risk aversion coeﬃcient shifts from 0.1 to 1 (Panel A) and from 1 to 2 (Panel B).
Calculations are made under the assumption of a uniform distribution across project size and risk. Parameter
values are in Table 4.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of empirical variables.
Panel A: Dependent Variable
γc,T
c mean med. s.d. range R¯2
FR 0.57 0.65 0.17 0.30-0.80 41.29%
GE 0.37 0.38 0.19 0.06-0.67 29.34%
NL 0.33 0.34 0.15 0.06-0.52 25.50%
SW 0.42 0.37 0.11 0.29-0.59 36.00%
UK 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.07-0.47 32.38%
Total 0.40 0.39 0.17 0.06-0.80 33.80%
Panel B: Independent Variables
wind;c,T wcrp;c,T wbnk;c,T
c mean med. s.d. range mean med. s.d. range mean med. s.d. range
FR 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.06-0.25 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.09-0.35 0.49 0.50 0.15 0.25-0.65
GE 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.02-0.28 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.08-0.47 0.45 0.52 0.14 0.21-0.63
NL 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00-0.21 0.25 0.30 0.13 0.06-0.43 0.61 0.58 0.18 0.29-0.84
SW 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.00-0.55 0.35 0.30 0.21 0.07-0.74 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.06-0.66
UK 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03-0.12 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.20-0.28 0.50 0.49 0.09 0.38-0.68
Total 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.00-0.55 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.06-0.74 0.49 0.49 0.16 0.06-0.84
Panel C: Correlations
γc,T wind;c,T wcrp;c,T
wind;c,T -0.50∗∗∗ 1
wcrp;c,T -0.33∗∗ 0.16 1
wbnk;c,T 0.21 -0.26 -0.47∗∗∗
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (Panel A) and independent variable
(Panel B) for France (FR), Germany (GE), the Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (SW) and United Kingdom
(UK) for the period 2001-2009 (Panel A) and 2002-2009 (Panel B). The yearly estimate of γc,T is obtained by
regression Rc,t ' a − γc,T∆V IXct + εct on daily data. In Panel A, the last columns reports the average R-
squared from the individual yearly regressions. In Panel C, superscripts ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistically significant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 7: Project risk and size characteristics per country.
Project risk Project size
Country
£
σminπ , σ
max
π
¤
High-Tech
£
Kmin,Kmax
¤
Exp./Dev.
FR [0.306, 0.371] 0.306 [1.91, 4.27] 0.634
GE [0.433, 0.475] 0.288 [1.95, 3.81] 0.643
NL [0.410, 0.531] 0.490 [1.95, 7.09] 0.738
SW [0.435, 0.499] 0.817 [1.74, 4.43] 0.329
UK [0.439, 0.526] 0.248 [1.84, 5.89] 0.629
This table reports, between brackets, the estimated range for project risk and project size that is consistent
with observed median VC fund raising shares per investor type. Results are obtained for France (FR), Germany
(GE), the Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (SW) and the United Kingdom (UK) for the period 2002-2009. The
range determination assumes a uniform distribution across project risk and project size. The High-Tech column
reports the aggregate proportion of VC funds that were expected by EVCA to be used in high-tech companies
for their expansion or development from 2002 to 2007. The Exp./Dev. column reports the aggregate proportion
of VC funds that were expected by EVCA to be used for the expansion or development of VC-backed companies
from 2002 to 2007.
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Table 8: Panel multiple regression of risk aversion on investor types.
γ0 wind;c,T wcrp;c,T wbnk;c,T d0607 R¯
2
0.393∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗ −0.069 0.127 57.47%
Basic Panel (0.126) (0.236) (0.197) (0.141)
Regression 0.340∗∗ −0.522∗∗ −0.056 0.181 0.076∗∗ 59.52%
(0.076) (0.234) (0.175) (0.164) (0.030)
Pool 0.231∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗ 0.230 0.392∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 69.26%
(0.103) (0.117) (0.211) (0.115) (0.028)
FR 0.410∗∗∗
Optimized (0.097)
Panel NL 0.083
Regression (0.088)
SW −0.212
(0.165)
UK 0.083
(0.088)
This table reports the panel least squares regression coeﬃcients for the generic equation γc,T = γ0 +P
i=ind,crp,bnk biwi;c,T+controls+ ηc,T estimated with yearly data on France (FR), Germany (GE), the
Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (SW) and the United Kingdom (UK) for the period 2002-2009. Standard
deviations are reported between parentheses. The dummy variable d0607 takes value 1 if the year is 2006
or 2007 and 0 otherwise. The other control variables have the structure controls = γ001{c=c1 or c2 or...} +P
i=ind,crp,bnk b
0
iwi;c,T1{c=c1 or c2 or...}. In the optimized panel regression, the specification chosen maximizes
the Schwarz information criterion. For each country specific coeﬃcient, significance is assessed on the net coef-
ficient value γ0+γ
0
0 or bi+b
0
i using the Wald test. Superscripts
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate statistically significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively.
56
Table 9: Relation between investor type and financing stage.
intercept γc,T − γ¯ Early stage Exp.-Dev. R¯2
Full sample
0.256∗∗∗
(0.068)
−0.224
(0.152)
0.378∗∗∗
(0.114)
−0.140
(0.092)
32.66%
Corporate Low RA
0.337∗∗∗
(0.106)
0.201
(0.402)
0.258
(0.163)
−0.195
(0.132)
30.80%
High RA
0.178∗
(0.094)
−0.504∗
(0.290)
0.452∗∗
(0.166)
−0.046
(0.142)
33.30%
Full sample
0.533∗∗∗
(0.081)
0.207
(0.180)
−0.222∗
(0.134)
0.215∗∗
(0.108)
19.98%
Bank Low RA
0.492∗∗∗
(0.128)
−0.026
(0.488)
−0.124
(0.199)
0.236
(0.160)
10.29%
High RA
0.596∗∗∗
(0.109)
0.606∗
(0.337)
−0.306∗
(0.193)
0.127
(0.165)
21.14%
This table reports the ordinary least squares regression coeﬃcients for the generic regression equation
wi;c,T =intercept+λ1(γc,T−γ¯) + λ2 (Early Stage)c,T +λ3 (Exp.-Dev.)c,T +νc,T estimated with yearly data
on France (FR), Germany (GE), the Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (SW) and the United Kingdom (UK) for
the period 2002-2009. Standard deviations are reported between parentheses. The Low RA and High RA
sub-samples correspond to the 20 country-year observations with lowest and highest risk aversion coeﬃcients,
respectively. Superscripts ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level,
respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1: Feasible contracts.
Figure 1a Figure 1b
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the feasible contracts between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in
the standard deviation - mean space when the entrepreneur does not (figure 1a) or does (figure 1b) finance the
venture. The curve labeled Ueφ is the entrepreneur’s initial utility function. The straight line labeled CML is
the Capital Market Line. Their tangency point is at coordinates
¡
σφ, µφ
¢
. The bold straight lines connect the
project characteristics
¡
Kσπ, rLπ
¢
, where rLπ ≡ rf +K (rπ − rf ) denotes the project’s levered return, with the
lower and upper bounds for the admissible rate of transfer between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist
(τ [e.i] and τ [i,e]). The arrow in figure 1b spans the possible utility gains for the entrepreneur resulting from all
feasible contracts.
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Figure 2: Bounds for rate of transfer — corporate VC case.
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Figures 2a to 2d plot τ [i,e] (straight line) and τ [e,i] (dashed line) as a function of project expected return
rπ (figure 2a), project return volatility σπ (figure 2b), entrepreneur’s risk aversion γe (figure 2c) and project’s
size relative to entrepreneur’s wealth K (figure 2d). Base case parameter values are in Table 4. The y-axis
is positioned at the base case value. The type of venture capital is corporate. In all the plotted domains,
endogenous S∗ is below 1, hence a contract is feasible when τ [i,e] < τ [e,i].
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Figure 3: Bounds for rate of transfer — independent VC case.
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Figures 3a to 3d plot τ [i,e] (straight line) and τ [e,i] (dashed line) as a function of project expected return
rπ (figure 2a), project return volatility σπ (figure 2b), entrepreneur’s risk aversion γe (figure 2c) and project’s
size relative to entrepreneur’s wealth K (figure 2d). Base case parameter values are in Table 4. The y-axis
is positioned at the base case value. The type of venture capital is independent. In all the plotted domains,
endogenous S∗ is above 1, hence a contract is feasible when τ [i,e] > τ [e,i].
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Figure 4: Optimal choice of VC type.
Figure 4a Figure 4b
Figure 4c
Figures 4a to 4c plot, as a function of project size (K) and project risk (σπ), the type of venture capitalist
that maximizes contract surplus with the entrepreneur. Base case parameter values are in Table 4. In Figure
4a, entrepreneur’s risk aversion is γe = 2. In Figure 4b, it is γe = 1. In Figure 4c, it is γe = 0.5.
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Figure 5: Diﬀerence in contract surplus.
Figure 5a Figure 5b
Figures 5a and 5b plot, as a function of project size (K) and project risk (σπ), the diﬀerence in contract
surplus between the corporate VC and the independent VC (Figure 5a), and between the corporate VC and
the bank-sponsored VC (Figure 5b). Base case parameter values are in Table 4.
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Figure 6: Endogenous dilution factor.
Figure 6 plots, as a function of project size (K) and project risk (σπ), the dilution factor obtained from
the optimal transfer rate. The VC type is endogenously determined. Base case parameter values are in Table
4.
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Figure 7: Project risk and size characteristics per country.
France Germany
The Netherlands Switzerland
United Kingdom
Figure 7 reports the estimated range for project risk and project size that is consistent with observed median
VC fund raising shares per investor type for the period 2002-2009. The range determination assumes a uniform
distribution across project risk and project size. Numerical results are reported in Table 7.
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Figure 8: Investor type and stage financing.
Figure 8a Figure 8b
Figures 8a and 8b plot, as a function of project size (K) and project risk (σπ), the type of venture
capitalist that maximizes contract surplus with the entrepreneur. Superimposed are the typical paths followed
by a venture through its diﬀerent development stages. Base case parameter values are in Table 4. In Figure 8a,
entrepreneur’s risk aversion is γe = 0.5. In Figure 8b, it is γe = 2.
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